

# Unifying horizontal and vertical interactions in the Bayesian language game

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**IN A NUSTELL** We propose a Bayesian framework that connects Bayesian *iterated learning* (IL) to *naming games* (NG), the two main branches of agent-based models of cultural language evolution. Surprisingly, the two appear to be closely related: the extremes of continuum. We find that Bayesian IL trivializes the effect of cultural evolution, whereas the Bayesian NG yields non-trivial, lineage-specific languages.


**TECHNICALITIES** The BNG is inspired by Bayesian IL models<sup>4</sup> and extends the NG of De Vylder & Tuyls.<sup>5</sup> Agents essentially perform repeated Bayesian updating in a Dirichlet-categorical:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SPEAKER} & \begin{cases} \theta_t | \alpha_{t-1} \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\alpha_{t-1}) \\ x_i | \theta_t \sim \text{Categorical}(\theta_t) \end{cases} \\ \text{HEARER} & \alpha_{t+1} := \alpha_t + c_t \end{aligned}$$

where  $\theta$  is a language,  $x$  a production,  $\alpha$  the param. of Dirichlet, and  $c$  a vector of counts.

## 1 Bayesian naming game


The speaker picks a language (a distribution over words), accounting for its innate biases towards certain languages, and produces a word. The hearer observes the word and updates the probabilities it assigns to all languages in a Bayesian fashion. On average, this makes the observed word more likely to be produced when the hearer later becomes a speaker. Alignment is thus increased.



Alternative interpretation: a language as a distribution over *linguistic features* rather than words.<sup>1</sup>

## 2 Population model


The **life expectancy**, in a random walk, interpolates between IL ( $\gamma = 1$ ) and NG ( $\gamma = \infty$ ).



## 3 Strategies: MAP-sample

Sample languages and productions or use the ones with **maximum probability** (MAP)?


$$\text{lang. strategy} \propto p(\text{lang} | \text{prod})^\eta, \quad \text{prod. strategy} \propto p(\text{prod} | \text{lang})^\zeta$$



## = Bayesian language game

Unified view of Bayesian agent-based models of cultural language evolution: from Bayesian IL to BNG, with all strategies.<sup>3</sup>

Parameter space. s-m = a sampling lang. strategy ( $\eta = 1$ ) and maximizing prod. strategy ( $\zeta = \infty$ )




<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Reali & Griffiths (2010), whose IL model is identical to the BLG with a life expectancy of 1 (i.e., the IL variant).  
<sup>2</sup> Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths (2007) use exponentiation to interpolate between samplers and maximisers.  
<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that in this framework, agents are not perfect Bayesian reasoners when they use a maximising production strategy (i.e.,  $\zeta > 1$ ).  
<sup>4</sup> E.g. Griffiths & Kalish (2007). In the IL setting ( $\gamma=1$ ), the Bayesian language game reduces to Reali & Griffiths (2009).  
<sup>5</sup> De Vylder & Tuyls (2006) proved convergence in a deterministic variant of a naming game of which ours is a near-direct generalisation. They use queue-agents and languages are always relative frequencies, which form a discrete subset of the simplex. We use the full simplex and no queue.  
Griffiths, T. L., & Kalish, M. L. (2007). Language Evolution by Iterated Learning With Bayesian Agents. *Cognitive Science*, 31(3), 441–480. <http://doi.org/10.1080/15326900701326576>  
Kirby, S., Dowman, M., & Griffiths, T. L. (2007). Innateness and culture in the evolution of language. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 104(12), 5241–5245.  
Reali, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2010). Words as alleles: connecting language evolution with Bayesian learners to models of genetic drift. *Proceedings Biological Sciences / The Royal Society*, 277(1680), 429–36.  
De Vylder, B., & Tuyls, K. (2006). How to reach linguistic consensus: A proof of convergence for the naming game. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 242(4), 818–831.

## Behaviour of the Bayesian naming game

In the BNG, coherence is reached with a **lineage specific language** that **reflects the biases**, but is non-trivially shaped by the cultural process.


The BNG reproduces **wide, constrained variation**. The variation is determined by the strength of the bias, and the average of different lineages gives the bias.

A. Lineage specificity and reflection of the bias




## Characterising the Bayesian language game

A. Iterated learning ( $\gamma = 1$ )




C. Quick turnover ( $\gamma = 10$ )




Outcomes of the BLG for IL, NG and two intermediate pop. turnover rates, for all 'extreme' strategies. The bias is a 'pyramid'.

The Bayesian IL model seems predictably determined by the biases (even for non-samplers). A higher life expectancy (lower turnover) re-

B. Naming Game ( $\gamma = \infty$ )



D. Medium turnover ( $\gamma = 100$ )



— Average language in population  
— Single agent's language — Used language

sults in stronger non-trivial cultural effects. The resulting language is shaped by both the bias and the cultural process.

**CONCLUSIONS** Iterated learning and naming games are naturally connected in the *Bayesian language game*. One extreme case, the Bayesian NG, reveals new behaviour: lineage-specific

languages that reflect innate biases of the learners. In comparison, Bayesian IL models seem to trivialize the cultural process. This highlights the importance of horizontal interactions.